Relational Physics and Quantum Space by Dreyer, Olaf
ar
X
iv
:g
r-q
c/
04
04
05
4v
1 
 1
3 
A
pr
 2
00
4
Relational Physics and Quantum Space
Olaf Dreyer∗
Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics,
35 King Street North, Waterloo, Ontario N2J 2W9, Canada
(Dated: October 7, 2018)
Abstract
In a purely relational theory there exists a tension between the relational character of the theory
and the existence of quantities like distance and duration. We review this issue in the context of the
Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. We then address this conflict by showing that a purely relational
definition of length and time can be given, provided the dynamics of the theory is known. We
further show that in such a setting it is natural to expect Lorentz transformations to describe the
mapping between different observers. We then comment on how these insights can be used to make
progress in the search for a theory of quantum gravity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In our current search for a quantum theory of gravity it is widely believed that the final
theory should be purely relational. A long-standing thorny issue for a relational theory is
the question of how quantities like distances and duration can be defined or emerge in a
purely relational manner.
This tension first became apparent in the correspondence between Clarke and Leibniz[1].
We will review that part of the correspondence that is concerned with the nature of space
and time and let it be our introduction to the problem of recovering the notions of distance
and duration in a relational theory. Leibniz stated his position in [1, Third paper, §4]:
“. . . I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is; . . . I hold it to be
an order of coexistences, as time is an order of succesions.”
Using his principle of the identity of indiscernibles Leibniz then goes on to demonstrate
that an absolute view of space and time is untenable and that the relative view is the only
sensible one. Clarke, not at all convinced, offers the following refutation of Leibniz’s position
[1, Third reply, §4]:
“If space was nothing but the order of things coexisting; it would follow, that if
God should remove in a straight line the whole world entire, with any swiftness
whatsoever; yet it would still always continue in the same place: and that nothing
would receive any shock upon the most sudden stopping of that motion. And if
time was nothing but the order of succession of created things; it would follow,
that if God had created the world millions of ages sooner than he did, yet it would
not have been created at all sooner. Further: space and time are quantities;
which situations and order are not.”
To a modern mind this argument given by Clarke looks rather vacuous and Leibniz’s reply
could be given by a physicist trained today [1, Fourth paper, §13]:
“To say that God can cause the whole universe to move forward in a straight line,
or in any other line, without making otherwise any alteration in it; is another
chimerical supposition. For, two states indiscernible from each other, are the
same state; and consequently. ’tis a change without any change. . . . ”
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Clarke does not acknowledge this argument. Instead he concludes that Leibniz’s position is
disproved [1, Fourth reply, §16 and §17]:
“That space and time are not the mere order of things, but real quantities has
been proven above, and no answer yet given to those proofs. And till an answer
be given to those proofs, this learned author’s assertion is a contradiction.”
Having held to his position for four papers Leibniz now commits two grave mistakes within
the space of two pages. The first one is the admission that there is ’. . . an absolute true
motion . . . ’ [1, Fifth paper, §53]
“. . . However, I grant there is a difference between an absolute true motion of a
body, and a mere relative change of its situation with respect to another body.
. . . ”
If that was not enough Leibniz goes on in the next paragraph to say that distances are
fundamental [1, Fifth paper, §54]
“. . . As for the objection that space and time are quantities, or rather things
endowed with quantity; and that situation and order are not so: I answer, that
order also has its quantity; there is in it, that which goes before and that which
follows; there is distance or interval. . . . ”
All Clarke has to do now is to collect his trophy. With the magnanimity of the victor he
points out [1, Fifth reply, §53]
“Whether this learned author’s being forced here to acknowledge the difference
between absolute real motion and relative motion, does not necessarily infer that
space is really a quite different thing from the situation or order of bodies; I leave
to the judgement of those who shall be pleased to compare what this learned
writer here alleges, with what Sir Isaac Newton has said in the Principia, . . . ”
Somewhat more triumphantly he continues in the next paragraph [1, Fifth reply, §54]:
“I had alleged that time and space were quantities, which situation and order
are not. To this, it is replied; that order has its quantity; there is that which goes
3
before, and that which follows; there is distance and interval. I answer: going
before, and following, constitutes situation or order: but the distance, interval,
or quantity of time or space, wherein one thing follows another, is entirely a
distinct thing from the situation or order, and does not constitute any quantity
of situation or order: the situation or order may be the same, when the quantity
of time or space intervening is very different.”
Thus ends the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke with a clear defeat for the rela-
tivists. If one looks at the arguments that have been presented it is not so much a defeat
but more of a self-destruction of Leibniz.
In this article we will propose to resolve the tension between quantity and relation using
a simple model from solid state physics. In section II we use a background-independent
formulation of the Heisenberg spin chain as a simple model of the universe. In section III
we show that observers inside the system can use the excitations of the model (without
reference to a lattice spacing) to define distances purely relationally. We also show that the
maps between observers are naturally given by Poincare´ transformations. This leads us to
interpret this model as a “quantum Minkowski space”. We briefly discuss consequences of
this argument for the problem of quantum gravity, as well as certain observations about the
precise relationship of our model to Minkowski space in the Conclusions.
II. A RELATIONAL SOLID STATE MODEL
How else could the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence have gone? How could the tension
between quantity and relation have been resolved? How is one to obtain the notion of
distance in a purely relational manner?
The first thing to realize is that the tension between quantity and relation can not be
resolved by relying on kinematics alone. Given a dynamical degree of freedom like a traveling
mode one can use it to define the notion of distance by defining how much it travels in a
certain amount of time, i.e. by defining its velocity. This is just how we define the unit of
length today, namely by setting the speed of light (see [2]). What is needed is a distinctive
set of traveling degrees of freedom or excitations, that can be used to define the notion of
distance in this way.
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To be concrete we will look at a particular model, the Heisenberg spin chain and its
higher dimensional generalizations. Its Hamiltonian is given by
H =
∑
(ij)
σi · σj, (1)
where σ = (σx, σy, σz), and the σ’s are the Pauli matrices. For nearest neighbor interactions
the lowest lying excitations are of the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
n
an|0 · · ·1 · · ·0〉, (2)
where the 0’s and 1’s denote eigenvectors of σz and the 1 occurs at the n-th position. The
an’s take the form
an = e
iδkn, (3)
and
δk = 2pi
k
N
, k = 1, . . . , N, (4)
where N is the number of lattice sites. Solving the Schro¨dinger equation gives the eigenvalues
of H as a function of k:
E = −NA + 4A
(
1− cos
(
2pi
k
N
))
. (5)
We will denote the corresponding eigenvectors by |k〉.
This is a set of traveling degrees of freedom of the model. In the next section we will use
these to give a purely relational definition of distance. Note that the excitations we have
introduced are perfectly well-defined without the introduction of a lattice spacing.
III. POINCARE´ TRANSFORMATIONS
Using the excitations of the model described above we can now proceed to define quan-
tities like distance in a completely relational manner. This can be done by picking one
particular excitation and assigning a speed to it. A length is then defined to be the amount
the excitation has travelled in a certain time interval.
A distinctive excitation in our model is given by the fastest wave packets. These excita-
tions are of the form ∑
k
f(k) |k〉, (6)
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FIG. 1: A view of the system that is not available to observers confined inside the system. The
observers A and B, here represented by the large Gaussian excitations, have no way of telling what
their motion is with respect to the lattice. This is why it is consistent for both observers to assign
the same speed to the excitation. There exists a map φ between the two coordinate systems given
by the mapping of physical events onto each other. This map φ will have the property that it maps
the fastest excitations onto fastest excitations. We find then that this map φ must be a Poincare´
transformation.
where f(k) is peaked around that value of k for which dE/dk is maximal. These wave packets
are distinguished by the fact that no other excitation can overtake them. All observers, which
can also be thought of as excitations of the system, will agree on that, independent of the
way they themselves move. This characterization is thus completely relational.
Since observers in the spin model have only the above excitations at their disposal to
explore their world there is no way for them to tell whether they are moving or resting with
respect to the lattice. It is thus consistent and natural for all of them to assign the same
speed to these excitations.
What will be the map between the coordinate systems of two observers? In the limit
that the spin system looks smooth to the observers we can answer this question. The map
can be constructed by mapping physical events onto each other. This map will in particular
map the fastest excitations in one coordinate system onto the fastest excitations in the other
system. Since these excitations have the same speed in both systems the map can only be
a Poincare´ transformation (see figure 1). One thus obtains a “quantum Minkowski space”.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As it was pointed out by Clarke in his correspondence with Leibniz, in a completely
relational theory there exists a tension between quantities and relations. We have seen here
how this tension can be resolved provided one has access to excitations that can be used
to define the notion of distance by defining the speed of these excitations. A consequence
of this definition is that the natural mapping between two observers is given by a Poincare´
transformation.
To define a notion of distance in a relational way it was necessary to have access to the
dynamics of the theory. A purely kinematic approach is not sufficient. It is here where
some of the candidate theories of quantum gravity, like Loop Quantum Gravity[3] or Causal
Set Theory[4], face their greatest problems. The arguments presented here suggest that the
dynamics of the theory is required to make progress on important issues like the question
of the semi-classical limit of the theory.
We conclude by remarking that the model presented above does deviate from usual
Minkowski space in two ways. In order for us to find Poincare´ transformations we as-
sumed that the excitations involved are all well separated from each other. If this is not the
case an operational definition of distance and duration can not be given anymore. Another
deviation occurs when the observers have access to excitations with very high values of k
(these excitations are not to be confused with the fastest excitations used above). In this
case the observers would notice the spin lattice and would find measurable deviations from
Poincare´ invariance.
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